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Abstract
We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and pol-
icymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down’ (policy) and ‘bottom-up’ (indi-
vidual and social-structural) inﬂuences on the development of interest groups.
Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of ﬁxed-sized
interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model
demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since
equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally,
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1leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model
can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational
density reported in empirical studies.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Interest groups play an important role in economic policymaking. Many empirical
studies show this for Europe and the U.S. (Richardson 1994, Potters and Sloof 1996).
Theoretically, the importance of this phenomenon is reﬂe c t e di ns t u d i e so nc o l l e c -
tive action (e.g. Olson 1965, 1982) and the upsurge of endogenous economic policy
models investigating the interaction between interest groups and economic policy-
makers (for a survey, see van Winden 2003). These models have provided valuable
new insights into the determinants of economic policies. Nevertheless, by focusing
on equilibria of properly deﬁned games with ﬁxed-sized interest groups and a govern-
ment as (informed and rational) players, their relevance is restricted in several ways.
First, existing models typically do not provide an explanation of the size of an inter-
est group. Second, the dynamics of the interaction between the players is neglected.
And, third, the standard assumption of one homogeneous type of (hyper)rational
individual decision making is often rejected in experimental studies.
In reality, the relations between a government and interest groups are inherently
dynamic. This is testiﬁed by the country studies collected by Richardson (1994).
Timely examples are provided by the increasing participation of environmentalists
and health groups in the development of agricultural policies, the changing political
0An earlier version of this paper appeared as Discussion Paper of the Tinbergen Institute, (TI
2000-022/1) and was presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the European Public Choice Society in
Paris, at the 2002 annual meeting of Association for Public Economic Theory in Paris, at a conference
on Lobbying and Institutional Structure of Policymaking in Rome (2002) and at a lecture at the
Department of Economics, University of Valencia, October 2002.
3landscape concerning tobacco, and the recent upsurge in NGOs that are increas-
ingly being co-opted into policymaking (The Economist 1999). On a more aggregate
level, the ﬂuctuations in the percentage of unionized workers in the U.S. may serve
as an illustration. According to Freeman (1997) the sudden spurts and declines in
union density shown in Figure 1 are not only characteristic for the U.S. but also for





















Figure 1: Time series of the density of union membership in the U.S., 1880-1995.
development of union densities in diﬀerent countries show that the pattern of these
ﬂuctuations over time is very diverse, with some countries facing increases while oth-
ers are experiencing declines. In his view, this constitutes at least suggestive evidence
against broad explanations (such as unions having become obsolete in modern mar-
ket economies), structuralist arguments (pointing at changes in the composition of
the work force), or general macroeconomic explanations (referring to the oil shock,
4for instance). Without denying the importance of political ‘top-down’ changes (like
labor laws), Freeman’s study of the development of union density in the U.S. argues
in favor of, ‘bottom-up’ models stressing “the underlying process by which organi-
zation occurs and the cumulative behavior of individual workers, unions, and ﬁrms.
(...) the behavior of thousands or millions of individuals acting in response to one
another” (Freeman 1997, p. 9). The above examples concerning agriculture, the
tobacco industry, and NGOs suggest that this bottom-up approach is also important
for an analysis of the development and inﬂuence of other interest groups.
Some bottom-up game-theoretic models of within-group cooperation and between-
group competition have been developed recently in the literature on rent seeking
(Baik and Lee 1997, Hausken 2000, Aidt 2002). However, these models typically
neglect dynamic issues by focusing on (Nash) equilibria. Moreover, highly sophis-
ticated strategic reasoning by individuals is assumed.1 A sn o t e db yO s t r o mi nh e r
presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1997: “We have
not yet developed a behavioral theory of collective action based on models of the
individual consistent with empirical evidence about how individuals make decisions
in social-dilemma situations” (Ostrom 1998, p. 1). Looking at the empirical ﬁnd-
ings concerning individual behavior, substantial evidence shows the following: be-
havior is generally not consistent with backward induction; Nash equilibria are often
bad predictors in non-market environments; individual memory appears to be of low
1In addition, they often miss the top-down link referred to above by assuming a ﬁxed contested
prize (e.g. Hausken 1995, Baik and Lee 1997).
5depth; strategic reasoning takes place in a step-by-step fashion; and ex-post ratio-
nality (choosing a direction which, with hindsight, would have been better in the
previous choice situation) appears to have a strong inﬂuence on the adaptation of
behavior (e.g. Selten 1998, van Winden 2002).2
In this paper we present a behavioral model of interest group size dynamics and
endogenous policymaking, taking these empirical observations into account.3 For
tractability, a simple model is developed which focuses on redistribution. The model
consists of three parts: one part determines the propensity of individuals belonging
to a social group or economic sector to participate in collective action, another part
determines the size and activity of interest groups, while the third part generates
government policy. Because the redistribution policy feeds back into the other two
parts of the model, the top-down and bottom-up approaches distinguished above
are integrated in one model. Since our goal is to focus on some basic aspects of
collective action, we leave open the precise nature of the social groups involved.
In our view, the model can be relevant for the analysis of the interaction between
social groups of various nature, as long as they have conﬂicting economic interests
and potential political inﬂuence (like workers versus capitalists, diﬀerent age groups,
diﬀerent industries within an economic sector, and so on). Our analysis consists of
2A related problem concerns decision making by groups. Existing experimental evidence is in-
conclusive regarding the issue whether groups behave more in line with standard game theory than
individuals (see Bosman et al. 2002). A ﬁeld empirical study by Whritenour Ando (2003) ﬁnds no
evidence of strategic behavior by competing interest groups, although they do react to costs and
beneﬁts.
3Nevertheless, as will be shown in Section 5, equilibrium outcomes of the model can be consistent
with a Nash equilibrium.
6three parts. First, we present a (comparative statics) equilibrium analysis. This is
f o l l o w e db ya ni n v e s t i g a t i o no ft h ed y n a m i c so ft h em o d e l .A n d ,ﬁnally, we confront
our model with data from the ﬁeld and the laboratory to check its empirical relevance.
Before going into our main ﬁndings, it is helpful to observe that we are basically
adding a participation eﬀect to the redistribution and inﬂuence (weight) eﬀects that
are typically studied with political economic models. Changes in political participa-
tion, triggered by policies or exogenous forces, for instance, generate additional polit-
ical inﬂuence and redistribution eﬀects. This leads to results that are in contrast with
the existing literature and help explain or throw a diﬀerent light on issues of interest.
From the equilibrium analysis, for example, we obtain the result that increasing the
political activity (contributions) of the members of an interest group now becomes
a two-sided sword. The reason is the negative participation eﬀect accompanying the
higher costs of political participation. On balance, this may eventually decrease the
inﬂuence of the interest group. This result may help explain the empirically am-
biguous eﬀect of sheer numbers in politics (Potters and Sloof 1996), because greater
numerical strength may be due to a smaller input (with lower cost) per member.
Less straightforward are the following results which relate to the economic sta-
tus of social groups or sectors. Changes in size or welfare level - via demographic,
international economic or technological shocks - appear to have very diﬀerent eﬀects
depending on whether the sector involved is taxed or subsidized, as well as the level
of taxation or subsidization. For example, growing subsidized sectors (think of the
7retired or agriculture in an extended Europe) may be confronted with smaller (indi-
vidual) subsidies, as one might expect, but may also enjoy larger subsidies. However,
subsidies will go down if the level of subsidization gets suﬃciently high. Further-
more, declining sectors may be helped by larger subsidies, but may also be burdened
with stiﬀer taxation. This sheds a new light, for instance, on increases in taxation
of the tobacco industry in countries where this industry is taxed and on the decline.
Declining sectors are not secured of political protection. On the contrary, politics
may even worsen the situation. In the paper we also discuss the consequences of
‘rising (or muted) expectations’ that may accompany socioeconomic, technological or
demographic developments.
Another main ﬁnding is that the collective action process may inhibit the oc-
currence of a stable political economic equilibrium. Complicated dynamics in the
interaction between the participation in interest groups and policymaking show up
in that case. Very diﬀerent types of ﬂuctuations in interest group sizes and redistri-
bution policy may be observed. For example, regular ﬂuctuations of short or long
length, or short ﬂuctuations superimposed on long ones, are obtained. Also highly
irregular patterns can occur. In this respect, our model contributes, for example,
to the explanation of empirically observed sharp declines in political protection (cf.
Cassing and Hillman 1986). Our analysis, furthermore, clearly shows the restrictive-
ness of the common assumption of ﬁxed sized interest groups in endogenous policy
models. It turns out that the innocence of such an assumption very much depends on
8the nature and state of the behavioral mechanisms (think of the occurrence of sudden
spurts and declines).
In addition to these theoretical results, we also ﬁnd that the model can replicate
the ﬁeld empirical time series data exhibited in Figure 1 as well as controlled data
from laboratory experiments that are within the domain of the model. The model
oﬀers an endogenous mechanism for these empirically observed patterns, in which
both top-down and bottom-up factors play a role.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 is con-
cerned with the equilibrium analysis, while Section 4 goes into the dynamic features
of the model. The model is confronted with ﬁeld and laboratory data in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
For expositional reasons, our model focuses on two economic sectors, A and B,e a c h
with a large number of agents. As further discussed below, the economic sectors may
represent diﬀerent ways of social grouping (e.g. socioeconomic groups, age groups,
income groups). All individuals in sector i (= A,B) a r ee n d o w e dw i t ha ni n c o m ewi.
There is no mobility between the sectors and the number of agents in each sector is
exogenously given as mi. Furthermore, all individuals are assumed to have the same
indirect utility function of income V (y), for which the following standard assumptions
hold: V (y) ≥ 0, V (0) = 0, V 0 (y) > 0, V 00(y) < 0 and limy→0 V 0(y)=∞.
9We assume that the government can redistribute income in period t by levying a,
possibly negative, lump-sum tax of τAt on the individuals in sector A, which implies
a lump-sum subsidy to the individuals in sector B equal to τBt = −
mA
mBτAt,g i v e nt h e
requirement of a balanced budget. Other policies will be abstracted from. We thus
focus on pure redistribution.
For individual j (j =1 ,...,m i)i ns e c t o ri indirect utility equals V (wi − τit).
For later convenience, let Vit ≡ V (wi − τit) where τAt = τt and τBt = −τtmA/mB.
Individuals in each sector can participate in collective action or, put diﬀerently, be
members of an interest group. Interest group activity consist of ‘lobbying’ for a
favorable tax τt, that, because of its uniformity, favors both the members (those who
are politically active) and the non-members in the respective sector. The group-
speciﬁc public good (bad) nature of the tax introduces the characteristic free-riding
problem for interest groups. Political participation is assumed to entail an input of
some eﬀort in the activities of the interest group (e.g. turning out and vote, or some
other contribution). Let li denote the given individual (lobbying) input in group i.
We ﬁrst present our model of the development of an interest group. Thereafter,
the determination of redistribution policy is formalized. The interest group model
consists of two submodels: one determining the individual propensity to join, and
another determining the size (membership) of the interest group. The ﬁrst submodel
deals with individual characteristics, while the second is to capture social-structural
conditions (cf. Marx and McAdam 1994). In developing the former we acknowl-
10edge the many experimental and ﬁeld empirical ﬁndings indicating that, when it
comes to collective action, individual behavior is adaptive rather than featuring the
strategically forward looking behavior of optimizing gamesmen. It reﬂects a strong
inﬂuence of ex-post rationality, reference points or aspiration levels, and a low depth
of memory (see Simon 1959, Ostrom 1998, Selten 1998, Camerer 2003). Furthermore,
substantial evidence from the ﬁeld and the laboratory shows that individuals caught
in a social dilemma are likely to invest resources to improve joint outcomes (Ledyard
1995, Ostrom 1998, van Winden 2002). Taking these empirically observed features
of individual behavior into account, we model the propensity of an individual to join
in interest group activity - the participation propensity - as being determined by the
following factors: actual utility Vit, a reference or aspiration utility level4 rij,a n dt h e
costs of the individual lobbying input li. To allow for individual diﬀerences in the ref-
erence level (e.g. due to diﬀerent personality traits or socioeconomic experiences), let
Ri denote the mean of the distribution of (rij)j,a n dβ
2
i its variance. Consequently, we
can write rij = Ri+βiεj assuming that εj ∼ F ,w h e r eF is a distribution with mean
0 and variance 1. Individual j in sector i is willing to join if and only if the diﬀerence
between reference utility and actual utility exceeds the (given) cost of participation,
i.e. rij − Vit >l i. The probability of that event is given by
Λit ≡ Pr(rij >V it + li)=1− F((Vit + li − Ri)/βi)
4Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) introduce an aspiration level in a model of (satisﬁcing) consumer
behavior.
11Some direct empirical evidence for the assumption that dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment policies is a determinant of political action is provided by studies of voter
behavior in national elections. In these studies the probability of voting for an op-
posing party (which can be considered as an interest group in itself) is found to be
related to the dissatisfaction of voters with the economic situation under the incum-
bent government (see e.g. Mueller 1989, Paldam 1997). Furthermore, with respect
to turnout it appears that not only the economic situation is important but also the
opportunity costs (Radcliﬀ 1992, Lijphart 1997).
Whether the propensity to participate in collective action materializes into actual
participation depends on the presence of facilitating social-structural conditions. For
example, legal rights to organize play an important role. A related factor concerns
the ability of leaders to mobilize discontent and to maintain membership, where dif-
fusion of information and exhortation via social networks and ties play an important
role (Rothemberg 1988, Marx and McAdam 1994). Put concisely, these conditions
determine the opportunity to get or stay involved - the participation opportunity.T o
capture this aspect of political participation in a simple way, we assume that there is
a ﬁxed probability λi with which this opportunity occurs to each individual in sector
i.5 As discussed above, the probability that this individual from sector i will join the
interest group is given by Λit. Assuming that individual decisions are independent
from each other and given a large number of individuals per sector, a law of large
5The parameter λi may also reﬂect an intrinsic individual opportunity for revising the participa-
tion status, in which case 1 − λi can be interpreted as an inertia parameter.
12numbers argument allows us to replace probabilities by fractions. That is, λi can be
interpreted as the fraction of the population from sector i that makes a participation
decision. A fraction Λit of those λimi individuals in sector i making a participation
decision will then indeed join the interest group, leading to a total size of ‘new’ interest
group members of λimiΛit (notice that some of these new members might also have
been interest group members in the previous period). Furthermore, again applying a
law of large numbers argument, a fraction 1−λi of the individuals that were interest
group members in the previous period will not reconsider their participation decision
in this period. From this we ﬁnd that the number of ‘old’ interest group members
is (1 − λi)nit. Adding the two components we ﬁnd that the (expected) sizes of the
interest groups (nit) evolve in the following way
ni,t+1 =( 1− λi)nit + λimiΛit,i = A,B. (1)
We turn now to the government. In line with the literature on endogenous policy
models, it is assumed that policymakers are interested in political support through
various contributions of interest groups, and that policies are adjusted to secure this
support (see e.g. Hillman 1989, Baron 1994, Nitzan 1994, Dixit et al. 1997; for
a theoretical survey, see van Winden 2003; the empirical evidence is surveyed by
Potters and Sloof 1996). Policymakers may be motivated in this respect by, for
instance, political survival (think of votes, endorsements, campaign support), career
prospects (revolving doors), a need for policy relevant expertise and eﬀort (for drafting
13legislation or building coalitions), or greed (corruption). Therefore, the lobbying
activity of interest groups6 and the size of the sectors that they represent are taken
to inﬂuence the extent to which their interests will be promoted by the government.
Since the focus of this paper is not on the precise mechanism relating interest group
activity to government policy, we take a reduced-form approach by assuming that
redistribution policy follows from the maximization of the following interest function
with respect to τ
G(τt)=LtmAVAt +( 1− Lt)mBVBt,
where the inﬂuence weight L : IR 2
+ → [0,1] is assumed to be increasing in lAnAt,a n d
decreasing in lBnBt, while taking the value 1/2 in case of an equal amount of total
lobbying input, nAtlA = nBtlB.7 Thus, the interest function is an inﬂuence weighted
sum of the aggregate utility (interests) of the individuals of sectors A and B.8 The
tax selected by the government is implicitly determined by the following ﬁrst-order
condition (the second-order condition being satisﬁed by concavity of V )
6It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully endogenize the lobbying activity of interest groups,
here determined by the ﬁxed lobbying input per member and the endogenous size of a group. How
such groups actually decide on the input level and its allocation over various activities is unclear.
At present no model based on solid empirical evidence exists that might be used for that purpose.
We will return to this issue in Section 6.
7The latter assumption is for simplicity. If, for ideological reasons, for instance, sector B would
be politically favored then L<1/2 when total lobbying eﬀorts are equal across sectors.
8For our model it does not matter if net welfare Vit − li is substituted for gross welfare Vit as
long as li is taken as given when redistribution policy is determined. By leaving eq. (2) unchanged,
this substitution would not aﬀect the results of the comparative statics and dynamic analysis below.




At =( 1− Lt)V
0
Bt. (2)
Summarizing, our model features the following sequence of events, in each period t.
First, individuals decide to join in interest group (lobbying) activities at a rate that
is determined by both individualistic characteristics (τt−1,r ij) and social-structural
conditions (λi). Then,t h et a xτt for that period is selected by the government, which
reﬂects the sizes of the sectors (mA,m B) and their total lobbying activity during the
ﬁrst part of the period (nAtlA,n BtlB).
The following proposition concerns the unique equilibrium of our dynamic model.
Proposition 1 The dynamic model speciﬁed by (1) and (2) has a unique equilibrium
deﬁned by the following set of equations
nA = mAΛA (3)
nB = mBΛB (4)
LV
0
A =( 1− L)V
0
B. (5)
(Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.)
153 Comparative statics: participation vs. redistri-
bution and inﬂuence eﬀects
In this section we investigate the equilibrium eﬀects on interest group sizes and re-
distribution policy of changes in the individual lobbying input (l), the size of a sector
(m), the income level in a sector (w), and the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution of individual reference utility values (R and β). Note that changes in
the social-structural parameter λ have no eﬀect on the equilibrium as it drops out
of eqs. (1) in the equilibrium. For convenience, we will focus on parameter changes
holding for sector A (similar eﬀects would be obtained for sector B). For expositional
reasons, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
It will be helpful for the intuition behind our results to distinguish three types
of eﬀects of changes in parameters: a redistribution eﬀect,apolitical inﬂuence eﬀect,
and a participation eﬀect.T h e ﬁrst two are standard in political economic models.
The redistribution eﬀect sets in because of the tendency of the government, given the
political inﬂuence of the social groups, to redistribute income such that the inﬂuence
weighted marginal utilities of the representative individuals of the groups are equal-
ized (see eq. (2)). The political inﬂuence eﬀect reﬂects the fact that an increase in
the political weight of an interest group, through an increase in its lobbying activity
(nili) or a decrease in another group’s activity, will tilt the tax rate in favor of the
sector it represents. The additional eﬀect studied in this paper concerns the partic-
16ipation eﬀect. This eﬀect relates to changes in political inﬂuence and redistribution
that are triggered by changes in political participation, which may themselves be the
consequence of changes in inﬂuence and redistribution.
3.1 Individual lobbying input: a two-sided sword
In conventional rent-seeking and lobbying models, which neglect the endogeneity of
t h es i z eo fa ni n t e r e s tg r o u p ,t h ei n ﬂuence of such a group is typically increasing in
the eﬀort of its members. With ﬁxed-sized interest groups this would also hold for
our model, inducing a lower tax rate for the group concerned. In this subsection we
are particularly interested in the following two questions. First, can an increase in
lobbying input and the concomitant positive eﬀect on a group’s inﬂuence attract more
members, thereby producing an additional boost to the group’s inﬂuence? Second, if
this is not the case, will it indeed lead to more inﬂuence (that is, a lower tax rate)?
The following proposition summarizes the eﬀects.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium size of the interest group in sector A, nA,i sd e c r e a s -
ing in the lobbying input of its members, lA. Moreover, letting the eﬀort elasticity of








(i) if H(lA) < 1 then the equilibrium tax rate, τ, is decreasing and the size of the
interest group in sector B, nB,i si n c r e a s i n gi nlA;
9If Λ ∈ C = {Λ(x)|limx→+∞
Λ0(x)
Λ(x) 6=0 } then there exists a l∗
A > 0 such that H(l∗
A) > 1 for
all lA >l ∗
A because liml→+∞ H(l)=+ ∞. Note that if, for example, F corresponds to the logistic
distribution then Λ ∈ C. Furthermore, the existence of lA such that H(lA) < 1 can be seen by noting
that lim l→0H(l)=0 .
17(ii) if H(lA) > 1 then the equilibrium tax rate, τ, is increasing and the size of the
interest group in sector B, nB,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nlA;
(iii) if H(lA)=1then the equilibrium tax rate, τ, and the size of the interest group
in sector B, nB, do not change with a marginal increase in lA.
In response to our ﬁrst question, the ﬁrst part of the proposition shows that
increasing the individual lobbying input will never generate a larger membership.
On the contrary, it will lead to a smaller sized interest group. If the lobbying input
would only have become more costly without any direct political inﬂuence eﬀect, this
result would not have been surprising. (Still, the fact that the pure cost eﬀect is
in this direction is a welcome aspect of the model, because there exists substantial
empirical evidence, for example, showing a negative eﬀect of voting costs on turnout
(see Lijphart 1997).) What makes it more interesting - in particular, in combination
with what follows next - is that the political inﬂuence eﬀect of the increased lobbying
input cannot reverse its pure cost eﬀect.10
Contrary to what conventional interest group models suggest, the second part
of the proposition shows that having interest group members put more eﬀort into
the lobbying activity may be disadvantageous to the group, that is, lead to higher
taxes. The reason is the (potentially strong) negative participation response. If the
only parameter change concerns the lobbying input in sector A, a higher tax on that
10An extra boost to a group’s inﬂuence might be obtained if the reference or aspiration utility
level of its members would start to adjust in the direction of the political outcome.
18sector occurs if and only if its political inﬂuence has become weaker. Thus, L must
have decreased. Now, since a higher tax would raise the net income of individuals in
sector B, and thereby negatively aﬀect the size of the interest group in that sector, a









where the second term of the expression in brackets, indicating the marginal decrease
in inﬂuence due to the smaller size of the interest group, is −H(lA).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
for this condition to hold it is required that the marginal loss of inﬂuence due to the
smaller size of the interest group exceeds the direct marginal gain (H(lA) > 1,a s
in the proposition). This negative participation response with its potential inﬂuence
eﬀects helps explain why in practice interest groups, such as unions, seem reluctant to
increase contributions (see also the concluding section). It further provides a caveat
for conclusions based on sheer numbers in politics (see also the next subsection).
3.2 Diﬀerential impact of changes in the size of taxed and
subsidized sectors
We now investigate the equilibrium consequences of a shock concerning the size of a
sector. Such a shock may be due to more or less autonomous technological or interna-
tional economic developments, migration forces, or demographic developments. With
19ﬁxed-sized interest groups, in the model, the subsequent redistribution eﬀect would
unequivocally have a negative eﬀect on the absolute value of the tax rate (subsidy)
of the sector involved. This changes, however, once political participation is allowed
to adjust. When the size of a sector is aﬀected, there is an immediate inﬂuence eﬀect
as well as a redistribution eﬀect. The size of a sector not only plays a direct role in
the interest function G(τ) maximized by the policymakers, it also directly aﬀects the
size and thereby the inﬂuence of its interest group (since ni = miΛi). In addition,
this induces participation eﬀects with further consequences for the sizes and political
inﬂuence of the interest groups. The next proposition summarizes the eﬀects of a
change in the size of sector A.
Proposition 3
(i) If τ ≥ 0 then the equilibrium tax rate, τ(≡ τA), is decreasing in the size of
sector A. Moreover, there exists a τ∗ ∈ (−wBmB/mA,0) such that if τ<τ ∗
then τ is increasing in the size of that sector;
(ii) If τ<0 then the equilibrium sizes of the interest groups in both sectors, nA and
nB, are increasing in the size of sector A. Moreover, there exist τ∗ ∈ (0,w A)
such that if τ>τ ∗ then the equilibrium sizes of the interest groups in both
sectors are decreasing in the size of that sector.
This proposition shows that a change in the size of a sector can have very diﬀerent
consequences dependent on whether a taxed or subsidized sector is at stake, and
20whether the change concerns an increase or decrease in size. First, notice from part
(i) that a taxed sector faces increased taxation when its size shrinks. In particular
the smaller tax base plays a role here, inducing a redistribution eﬀect. (Incidentally,
this may shed a new light on some of the tax increases faced by a declining sector
like the tobacco industry.) Moreover, part (ii) shows that interest group activity will
nevertheless increase if the existing tax rate is suﬃciently large. For a subsidized
sector - like a protected industry - a further decline in its size may be upheld by an
increase in subsidies, given that the existing level of subsidization is suﬃciently large
(part (i)), although interest group activity will decrease (part (ii)). The underlying
reason is that it is less costly for the taxed sector to maintain a smaller subsidized
sector (redistribution eﬀect), while the loss in inﬂuence of the latter is not suﬃciently
strong. Note, however, that with smaller existing subsidies the outcome can be a
decrease in subsidy, due to the loss of inﬂuence. Our ﬁnding that, in general, the
policy response can go either way contributes to the formal literature on the political
protection of declining industries where the possibility of ambiguous eﬀects has been
hinted at (Hillman 1989). In the next subsection, where we discuss the impact of
income changes, we will return to this topic.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that growing taxed sectors will witness a
decrease in taxation, whereas interest group activity may increase or decrease, de-
pending on the existing level of taxation. This result provides a formal argument
to the largely empirical debate (focusing on correlations) concerning the relationship
21between economic development and interest group activity (see Olson 1982, Bischoﬀ
2003). On the other hand, economies with growing subsidized sectors - such as social
security in aging societies or agriculture in an extended Europe - would be confronted
with increasing interest group activity, while subsidies may go either up or down. The
outcome that subsidies will go down if the existing level is high seems reﬂected by
the current European debate on agricultural policy. The fact that subsidies need not
necessarily go down - as one would expect on the basis of the redistribution eﬀect
alone - is due to the immediate positive eﬀect of an increase in the size of a sector on
its interest group activity.
Finally, we note that the ambiguity of the policy eﬀects that we ﬁnd here is in line
with the mixed empirical evidence presented in Potters and Sloof (1996) concerning
the political inﬂuence eﬀect of numerical strength.
3.3 Sectoral income growth boosts taxation and discourages
organization
In the previous subsection we have seen that sectoral development produces ambigu-
ous policy eﬀects insofar as changes in the size of a sector are concerned. Income
growth, on the other hand, turns out to have unambiguous eﬀects. A positive sec-
toral income shock — due to technological or international economic developments,
for example — induces redistribution of income away from that sector, for given po-
litical inﬂuence weights (as would hold in case of ﬁxed-sized interest groups). A drop
22in the income level would lead to a reverse eﬀect. However, it also aﬀects political
participation, and thereby political inﬂuence. The precise eﬀects depend on the net
outcome of these two forces. The next proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium tax rate, τ(≡ τA), is increasing in the income of the
taxed sector, wA. However, in both sectors, net (after transfer) income is an increasing
function of the same income. On the other hand, the equilibrium sizes of the interest
groups in both sectors, nA and nB, are a decreasing function of that income.
Interestingly, our results suggest that improvement in productivity of a sector
would not only have an overall positive eﬀect on net income, but also reduce interest
group activity. This income growth eﬀect provides an additional reason why eco-
nomic development may be accompanied by less interest group activity. It thereby
produces a counter-argument to the hypothesis that interest group activity may be
a concomitant of economic development (Bischof 2003). To the extent that interest
group activity is correlated with corruption, this result also suggests that in addition
to being detrimental to economic growth (Mauro 1995) corruption may in its turn
be negatively aﬀected by it, which might induce a vicious circle. Of course, one has
to be careful here because many other factors are likely to be involved in economic
development. One such factor, concerning reference utility levels, will be addressed
in the next subsection.
Returning to the political protection of declining industries, note that (in contrast
with the ambiguous declining size eﬀect): the income eﬀect will be unequivocally
23beneﬁcial to such industries, in the sense that taxes will decrease or subsidies will
increase. On balance, however, the policy response to the economic decline of a sector,
involving lower income as well as a shrinking size, can go either way. Incidentally, our
model also gives a behavioral underpinning for the possibility of a ‘sudden collapse’
of an industry. Although this is not an equilibrium issue, a few words on it here may
be justiﬁed since we are now discussing political protection. Cassing and Hillman
(1986) propose an explanation where the driving force is the assumed S-shape of the
exogenously given positive relationship between the policy (a tariﬀ)a n dt h es i z eo ft h e
industry (amount of labor), which can lead to a sudden drop in political protection.
As will become clearer in the section on dynamics, in our model a sharp decline
in political protection (subsidies) can occur through the basic non-linearity in the
propensity to participate in interest group activity.
3.4 Reference utility levels and group heterogeneity
Given the redistribution policy, individualistic characteristics represented by the in-
dividual reference utility (aspiration levels) rij determine individuals propensity to
participate in interest group activity. The higher the average reference utility level of
the individuals in a sector - denoted by Ri - the more dissatisﬁed they will be with the
existing government policy. The eﬀect this will have on the participation propensity
further depends on the heterogeneity of the individuals in this respect, denoted by
βi. The more heterogeneous the sectoral population, the smaller the eﬀect of the
24average propensity to participate on the size of the interest group. (Recall that, in
equilibrium, the participation opportunity,i n d i c a t e db yλi, plays no role.) The next
proposition summarizes the eﬀects of a change in RA and βA.
Proposition 5
1. The equilibrium sizes of the interest groups in both sectors are increasing in the
mean of the distribution of individual reference utility levels in sector A, RA.
Furthermore, the equilibrium tax rate, τ,o fs e c t o rA is a decreasing function of
RA;
2. Regarding the standard deviation (heterogeneity) parameter βA the following is
obtained, where τc ≡ wA − V −1 (RA − lA):
(i) if τ<τ c then the equilibrium tax rate (τ)o fs e c t o rA is decreasing in
βA, while the sizes of the interest groups in both sectors (nA and nB)a r e
increasing in βA;
(ii) if τ>τ c then the equilibrium tax rate of sector A is increasing in βA,
while the sizes of both interest groups are decreasing in βA;
(iii) if τ = τc then both the equilibrium tax rate of sector A, and the sizes of
the interest groups do not change with a marginal increase in βA.
Note that τc indicates the tax rate that makes the ’average’ individual in sector
A (with rAj = RA) indiﬀerent with respect to joining in interest group activity. The
25ﬁndings of result 2 are then easily understood by observing that a smaller standard
deviation of the distribution of reference utility levels (βA) steepens the probability
function describing the participation propensity (ΛA), making it more like a step-
function. For example, if τ<τ c (τ>τ c) and the sector becomes more homogeneous
through a smaller βA, the more step-function like shape of the probability function
implies less (more) participation and therefore a larger (smaller) tax rate
Our model provides a new potential explanation for the empirical ﬁnding that po-
litical participation increases with higher income (see e.g. Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone
1980, Schram 1991, Leighley and Nagler 1992, Lijphart 1997). For the sake of the
argument, suppose that individuals with relatively high income belong to sector A,
and those with low income to sector B. The mean income of individuals in sector i is
represented by wi. Furthermore, it seems plausible to assume that the mean reference
utility for individuals in sector i satisﬁes Ri ≥ V (wi)+li, in which case a positive
tax rate for sector A implies that V (wA − τ)+lA <R A. Then, if the tax rate is
big enough to drive V (wB +
mA
mBτ)+lB ≥ RB, participation among the low income
individuals will always be lower (ΛA > ΛB). If not (i.e. ∆VB < 0)t h e n , for small
enough βA, t h er a t eo fd i s s a t i s ﬁed individuals among those with a high income will
be larger than the rate among individuals with a low income (∆VA/βA < ∆VB/βB).
Hence, if it may be assumed that the group of high income earners is relatively more
homogeneous (e.g. because of better information and contacts), also in that case the
participation rate of those with high income will be larger than that of low income
26earners.11
4D y n a m i c s
An important issue that we are interested in in this paper concerns the dynamics of
the model consisting of equations (1) and (2). It is well-known that nonlinear systems
like the present model can give rise to dynamic patterns such as periodic cycles and
irregular ﬂuctuations. In fact, these patterns seem to be the rule rather than the
exception in many nonlinear dynamic models. Examples of erratic ﬂuctuations arising
naturally in economic dynamic models can, for example, be found in the literature
on endogenous business cycle theory (e.g. Grandmont 1985, de Vilder 1996).
As will be shown below, also in the present model equilibria need not be stable
and complicated dynamic patterns may emerge for a large set of parameter values.
This occurs because a successful interest group diminishes the attraction to join it,
whereas its success is, of course, positively correlated to its relative size. These two
countervailing forces naturally lead to endogenous ﬂuctuations.12
We will focus on the values of the heterogeneity parameter β and the participation
parameter λ. Instability arises if, for a given (but not too high) level of heterogeneity
β, the participation opportunity λ becomes suﬃciently large. We start with the
11Also, note that if economic development would aﬀect reference utility levels, via ‘rising (or
muted) expectations’, this would further complicate the relationship with interest group activity.
For instance, ‘rising expectations’ fostered by economic growth might lead to an increase in activity,
notwithstanding the negative direct income eﬀect discussed above.
12A similar mechanism underlies the political business cycles emerging in the two-sector general
equilibrium model discussed in Tuinstra (2000).
27following general result.
Proposition 6 Consider the model given by eqs. (1) and (2). There exists λ
f > 0
such that the equilibrium (n∗
A,n ∗




f < 1 a period-doubling bifurcation occurs at λ = λ
f.
At a bifurcation there is a qualitative change in the behavior of the dynamic sys-
tem. More speciﬁcally, at a period-doubling bifurcation the locally stable equilibrium
becomes unstable and trajectories of the dynamic system are attracted to a period
two orbit, where interest group activity keeps on ﬂu c t u a t i n gb e t w e e nt w ov a l u e s .
That is, in even periods the system is in state (nA,n B)=( nI,n II) whereas in odd
periods the system is in state (nA,n B)=( nIII,n IV),w i t hnIII 6= nI and nIV 6= nII.
More complicated time series may also obtain. To get a better view of the possible
dynamics, we specify the model in the following way. We assume an iso-elastic indi-
rect utility function V (y)= 1
1−αy1−α,w i t h0 <α<1. Furthermore, taking a logistic






3),w eh a v e
Λ([Vi + li − Ri]/βi)=
1
1+e x p( ηi [Vi + li − Ri])
. (6)
where ηi ≡ π √
3βi.
Moreover, we consider a symmetric version of the model with mA = mB =1(thus,
ni can be interpreted as the fraction of people organized in sector i), lA = lB = l,
wA = wB = w,a n dβA = βB = β. For this (sector) symmetric model a unique
28equilibrium exists with τ =0and nA = nB = n∗ = 1
1+expη[V (w)+l−R].T h i s l e a d s t o
the next proposition for our stability result.
Proposition 7 Consider the symmetric model speciﬁed above. There exists a β
∗ > 0
such that for β>β
∗, the symmetric equilibrium (nA,n B)=( n∗,n ∗) is locally stable
for all λ ∈ (0,1).F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o rβ<β
∗ the symmetric equilibrium is locally stable
for λ<λ
f and unstable for λ>λ
f,w h e r eλ











with W =e x p
¡ η
1−α (w1−α + l − R)
¢
.F o r β<β
∗, the system undergoes a period-
doubling bifurcation at λ = λ
f. At this period-doubling bifurcation a symmetric period






with nI <n ∗ <n II, emerges.
To illustrate, we consider some simulations with w =1 0 , R =7 ,l=1 ,a n dα = 1
2.
For high values of β, that is, for a highly heterogeneous population the equilibrium is
stable. However, if β suﬃciently decreases the equilibrium becomes unstable. This is
illustrated in Figure 2. The graph shown in this ﬁgure divides the (β,λ)-space into
a region with stable equilibria (below the curve) and unstable equilibria (above the
curve).13












































B: the bifurcation curve 
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Figure 2: Regions in the (β,λ)−plane with stable and unstable equilibrium and the bifur-
cation curve along which a period-2 cycle emerges.
Recall from Section 2 that λ indicates the participation opportunity, that is, the
presence of social-structural conditions facilitating the transformation of the propen-
sity to participate in collective action into actual participation. Legal rights of col-
lective action, the presence of leaders able to mobilize discontent, and the existence
of social networks and ties enabling the diﬀusion of information and the exhortation
of people, are among the relevant factors determining this opportunity. Our results
would predict that a society becomes more vulnerable to political instability the more
it oﬀers here (i.e., the larger λ), especially when it is also more homogeneous (i.e.,
the smaller β). The instability confronting former centrally planned economies while
opening up politically seems suggestive in this respect. In its turn, a greater diversity
in political preferences (a larger β) stimulated by democratic institutions could then
30help explain the relative stability of many developed democracies.
We will now ﬁx λ =0 .1 and investigate, for diﬀerent values of β,h o wi n t e r e s t
group activity and tax policy evolve. For λ =0 .1 the period-doubling bifurcation
d e s c r i b e di nP r o p o s i t i o n7o c c u r sa tβ
f ≈ 0.47. At this value of β the equilibrium
becomes unstable and a period two cycle emerges. For β close to, but smaller than
β
f almost all orbits of the symmetric dynamic system are attracted to this type of
cycle. This cycle corresponds to the situation where in one period interest group A
is ‘large’ and interest group B is ‘small’, and the people in sector B are taxed to the
beneﬁto fp e o p l ei ns e c t o rA, while in the next period the situation is reversed. For
smaller values of β more complicated dynamic patterns emerge. The panels in Figure
3 illustrate the occurrence of strange attractors and the corresponding time series for
diﬀerent values of β.
The intuition for these time series is the following. An increase in the size of one
of the interest groups leads to a new tax, which is more beneﬁcial to this interest
group. This leads to an increase in the size of the other interest group which induces
a tax rate more beneﬁcial to this interest group. In this fashion interest group activity
keeps increasing until the process loses momentum, due to a diminishing eﬀect on the
tax schedule, and is eventually reversed. With smaller β the reverse process becomes
dominated by the inﬂuence of λ, which causes the ‘following’ type of behavior in the
decline of the interest groups illustrated by the bottom panel in the ﬁgure.
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Figure 3: Top to bottom panels correspond to diﬀerent values of β for the symmetric model
with parameters: l =1 , R =7 , w =1 0 , m =1 , α =0 .5 and λ =0 .1.T h e ﬁrst column
shows the time series of the fraction of people organized in sector A (solid-line) and sector
B (dotted line); second column shows the time series of tax in sector A; third column shows
the attractors.
325 Replicating ﬁeld and experimental time series
The dynamic analysis from the previous section shows that focusing on equilibria can
be very misleading, because they may be unstable and therefore extremely unlikely to
be obtained. Instead, complicated dynamics may emerge. Whereas for the symmetric
cases examined in Figure 3 it holds that the patterns are still regular in some sense,
more irregular time series are obtained once asymmetry is allowed. To illustrate, the
top panel in Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the model in case that: wA =4 ,w B =1 0 ,
β =0 .18, lA =0 .4,l B =1 ,R A =4 .2 and RB =7 .


















































































Figure 4: Top panel: time series of the fraction of individuals organized in sector A and
of the tax on individuals in that sector for the model with the following asymmetric para-
meters: wA =4 , wB =1 0 , mA/mB =1 , α =0 .5, λ =0 .1 and li/wi =0 .1, Ri = li +6
√
li
where i=A,B. Bottom panel: left ﬁgure shows a fragment from the left ﬁgure in the top
panel, right ﬁgure reproduces Figure 1.
33The left ﬁgure in the bottom panel shows the corresponding time series for a particular
t i m ei n t e r v a l .W h e nc o m p a r e dw i t ht h er i g h tﬁgure in this panel - which reproduces
Figure 1, taken from Freeman (1997) - the resemblance of these two ﬁg u r e si ss t r i k i n g .
By letting one sector represent workers and the other sector owners or managers, it
shows that the internal dynamics of our model alone can generate ﬂuctuations in
organizational density that are similar to the unionization of workers in the U.S. that
Figure 1 refers to. No exogenous shocks are needed. In his study, Freeman distin-
guished two types of models that can generate spurts in union growth. First, standard
linear models in which exogenous shocks (usually generated by political forces, like
laws) generate responses in otherwise stable union membership. Second, models in
which the growth process creates non-linearities producing ‘phase transitions’ when
certain conditions are met (models of self-organized complexity). Our model is a ﬁrst
attempt ﬁtting the second type. Of course, we are not claiming here that we pro-
vide an explanation of the particular historical development illustrated by the ﬁgure.
To do so would require changes in many parameters over time (like income growth)
in an appropriate way. Moreover, as argued by Freeman (1988), the redistribution
conﬂict between workers and managers at the ﬁrm level should then also be taken
into account. The only claim we want to make is to have shown in a rigorous way
that by integrating top-down (policy) and bottom-up (behavioral) factors spurts and
declines in the organizational density of interest groups as observed in practice can
be endogenously generated, without any reliance on exogenous shocks.
34But we can do more than that. To challenge our model in a more demanding
way we will use a diﬀerent data set. To avoid the noise and impact of intervening
variables that are hard to control for in ﬁeld empirical data, we use the experimental
data reported in Schram and Sonnemans (1996). The design of their experiment turns
out to be within the domain of our model. In the experiment, 12 subjects were divided
into two groups. In each round of the experiment, subjects ﬁrst (and independently)
had to make a decision whether or not to contribute a token, where contributing
would cost 70 Guilder cents (which corresponds to approximately 0.32 Euro). Then,
after all subjects had made a decision, an amount of 222 Guilder cents was divided
(by a computer program) between the two groups according to the relative amount
of total contributions. Finally, each subject within a group was given the amount
allocated to his or her group, irrespective of whether (s)he contributed or not. Noting
that the rule determining the tax is similar, it is easily seen that the game subjects
were asked to play in this experiment is within the domain of our model (with w = 111
and l =7 0 ; see eqs. (1)). To check the performance of our model we proceeded as
follows. First, we calibrated the relevant parameters (λ,β,R) using the time series of
the participation rates for one of the groups.14 Then, with the calibrated parameters
(λ
c,β
c,R c) and the initial values of the participation rates (nA,0,n B,0) taken from the
experimental (real) data, we generated new (simulated) data with our model. We
14The calibrated parameters are the ones that minimize the root mean square error regarding
the simulated data and the real (experimental) data. In total we have data for 7 pairs of matched














































Figure 5: Time series of the voting participation rates for two groups in the Schram and
Sonnemans (1996) experiment (solid line) and the simulated data (dotted line) with the
calibrated parameters. Left ﬁgure shows time series for the group used for calibrating
behavioral parameters, right ﬁgure shows time series for a randomly chosen group.
ﬁnd that the null hypothesis of equal distributions for the simulated data and the
real data cannot be rejected in 95% of the cases (at the 5% level, using a t-test, a
Mann-Whitney test, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).15 Furthermore, to investigate
whether our model can replicate the dynamic paths, we generated a new set of data,
this time with calibrated initial values (keeping λ
c,β
c, and Rc ﬁxed).16 Then for each
of the 14 groups, we (linearly) regressed the real data on the simulated data and
tested for the joint hypothesis of slope =1and intercept =0 . It turns out that
the joint hypothesis cannot be rejected in 9 (64%) of the cases (at the 5% level; see
Appendix for more details). For illustration, Figure 5 presents the time series for two
groups from diﬀerent sessions, one of which was used to calibrate parameters.
15Excluding the data for the pair used for the calibration of the parameters (λ,β,R),w eh a v e
for any given round t two real plus two simulated data samples, with each sample being of size 6
(matched groups are in diﬀerent samples). Thus, since there are 19 rounds (t =2 ,...,20,w i t ht h e
ﬁrst round excluded because these data are used as initial values in generating the simulated data),
we have 38 (= 19x2) samples of size 6. Note that the (simulated and real) data in each of the above
samples are independent.
16The calibrated initial values are among the ones that minimize the root mean square error




36In light of the highly nonlinear dynamics of the experimental data, the track-
ing performance of the model is quite remarkable. Furthermore, it is interesting to
note that the calibrated parameters are from the unstable region (C), which implies
that the (unique) equilibrium of the model is not stable. Thus, for the calibrated
parameters, the equilibrium stability analysis suggests that the ﬂuctuations in the
participation rates observed during the 20 rounds of the experiment are not a tem-
poral phenomenon. They seem to reﬂect inherent and persistent properties of the
interaction process. One should be cautious, therefore, with conclusions based solely
on an equilibrium analysis. In this context, it is noted that the (symmetric) Nash
equilibrium participation rate (say, pN) for the game studied in the experiment would
be the same as our model equilibrium (p∗ = Λ((V (w)+l − R)/β)) for any set of pa-
rameters (β,R) that satisfy βΛ−1(pN)=V (w)+l − R. Consequently, our model
does not preclude an equilibrium outcome that is identical to the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, for the calibrated parameter values (β
c,R c), the equilibrium point of our
model is p∗ =0 .045 whereas pN =0 .096. Thus, even for these values the equilibrium
outcomes are, observationally, hardly diﬀerent. However, we ﬁnd that λ
c is not suf-
ﬁciently small for this equilibrium point to be stable, so that it is very unlikely that
it will ever be reached.17
17Schram and Sonnemans ﬁnd that the experimental data reject the hypothesis of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Goeree and Holt (2000) show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for
the game studied in the experiment of Schram and Sonnemans always predicts a strictly positive
participation rate which is bounded from below by the Nash equilibrium and from above by 50%.
However, data at the group level show that during the last 10 (5) rounds the participation rate is
out of that range in 42% (40%) of the cases.
376C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have presented a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes
and policymaking, focusing on redistribution. It integrates both top-down (policy)
and bottom-up (individual and social-structural) inﬂuences on the development of
interest groups. Our results clearly demonstrate the restrictiveness of the common
procedure in political economic modeling to assume ﬁxed interest group sizes and
to concentrate attention on equilibria. As summarized in the Introduction, our main
ﬁndings show eﬀects that contrast with the existing literature and further help explain
or throw a diﬀerent light on various political economic issues. We also provided
empirical support for the model. All in all, the results obtained from our investigation
seem interesting and realistic enough to warrant further theoretical and empirical
investigation. From among the issues that appear to be interesting for future research
we would like to single out the following.
First of all, the strength of the behavioral model should be further empirically
investigated, focusing on speciﬁc institutional forms of collective action. Controlled
laboratory experiments can be very fruitful in this respect, as the application in
this paper may show. Furthermore, it would be important to gain more knowledge
regarding the way that individuals form and adapt reference utility levels. Models
based on solid empirical evidence are lacking (see e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001).
This is all the more important because of the relation with emotions (cf. Simon
1959). The role of emotions in inducing people to participate in collective action is
38seriously neglected. Although there are many casual statements by professional and
academic experts bearing this out - for example, referring to hatred as a motivation
for political terrorism -, theoretical models are missing (van Winden 2002).
Another area of interest concerns the endogenization of the decision making
process of interest groups. How, for example, is the level of the individual lobbying
input determined, and to what extent are these decisions inﬂuenced by other interest
groups? As regards the former issue, our results point at an interesting dilemma for
interest group leaders. If their main interest is in the size of the interest group (like
bureaucrats are interested in the size of their bureau, as the standard public choice
hypothesis has it) they may want to opt for a very low individual input. However,
if their main concern would be the welfare of the members a higher individual input
may be warranted, inducing lower taxes or higher subsidies but also a smaller group
size (see part (i) of Proposition 2). Incidentally, this potential conﬂict of interests
makes it understandable why they may have reservations concerning social welfare
policies (cf. Neumann and Rissman 1984), and why they seem reluctant to raise
fees. A further complicating issue is that an interest group leader may not be in the
position to impose her or his preferences, which means that some form of compro-
mising will have to take place shaped by the internal institutions of the group. The
question about the inﬂuence of other interest groups can only be answered through
empirical evidence. The available evidence is not clear in this respect, but suggests
little strategizing (if any at all). Again, laboratory experimentation can be helpful to
39generate insights, also regarding the resolution of the conﬂicting interests that may
exist among the members. Much interesting work remains to be done.
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B,τ∗) of the model is implicitly deﬁned as a solution to
nA = mAΛA, (7)
nB = mBΛB, (8)
LV
0
A =( 1− L)V
0
B, (9)
Denote L = L(lAmAΛA,l BmBΛB) and deﬁne
f (τ) ≡ LV
0
A − (1 − L)V
0
B.
The equilibrium value of τ c o r r e s p o n d st oaz e r oo ff (.). The associated equilibrium
values of nA and nB then follow from the other two equilibrium conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1 (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium)
First observe that the assumption limy→0 V 0 (y)=+ ∞ implies that limτ→−wBmB/mA f (τ)=
−∞ and limτ→wA f (τ)=+ ∞. The continuity of f on a connected set implies that





















this equilibrium is unique.¥
47A.1 Comparative statics
In order to study the comparative statics of the full model we take the total diﬀerential
of f (≡ LV 0
A − (1 − L)V 0
B) with respect to τ, lA, mA, wA,β A, and RA. This gives
fτdτ + flAdlA + fmAdmA + fwAdwA + fβAdβA + fRAdRA =0
with fτ =
∂f
∂τ given by (10) and













































where 4VA = VA + lA − RA.
Furthermore, we have






A/βA > 0,A lA = mAΛ
0























B/βB and BlA = BwA = BRA =0 .





















With respect to nA and nB we ﬁnd
dnA
dlA
























Straightforward calculations show that: (a) (1−V 0
A
dτ
dlA) ≥ 0 always and therefore nA
49can never increase, and (b) nB increases if and only if τ decreases.¥

























where P(τ) ≡ lAΛAL1 (V 0
A + V 0
B) > 0, and Q(τ) ≡ lBΛ0
BV 0
BL2 (V 0
A + V 0




dmA > 0 if and only if P(τ)+τQ(τ) < 0.S i n c eb o t hP(τ) and Q(τ)are
positive, for τ ≥ 0,w eh a v edτ





























BL2/βB − (1 − L)V 00
B/((V 0











AL1/βA − LV 00
A/((V 0




BL2/βB − (1 − L)V 00
B/((V 0






AL1/βA − LV 00
A/((V 0









wB M (τ) = limτ→−
mB
mA
wB K (τ)=0 , since the right-hand sides of




B = ∞. Therefore, there exists a τ∗ < 0
50such that dτ










= Ama + Aτ
dτ
dmA









dmA,w eﬁnd that nA increases with an increase in mA if and only if














A + V 0




Clearly, for τ 6 0 the above inequality is always satisﬁed, hence if τ 6 0 then nA
increases as mA goes up. Furthermore, limτ→wA V 0
A =+ ∞ implies that there exists















Hence nB increases with an increase in mA if and only if dτ
dmA < − τ
mA which is
equivalently with
τ + Z(τ) < 0,













< 0. Note that the last inequality is always




A implies lim τ→wAZ(τ)=0and therefore, there exists some positive τb such that
nB decreases if τ ∈ (τb,w A).
Denoting τ∗ =m a x {τa,τb}, we have that for a growing sector A both groups get
smaller if τ ∈ (τ∗,w A).¥








Note that we have fτ > −fwa > 0 and therefore 0 < dτ
dwA < 1, implying that the tax
rate τ,a sw e l la sn e ti n c o m e wA −τ i n c r e a s e sw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei ng r o s si n c o m e wA.
With respect to nA and nB,we have
dnA
dwA














which is negative since dτ


































which is positive since 1+V 0
A
dτ
































dβA has the opposite sign with 4VA. Thus, dτ
dβA is positive if and only if
τ>w A − V −1 (RA − lA).
















which is positive if and only if 4VA + βAV 0
A
dτ
dβA > 0, or equivalently τ<w A −











hence the sign of
dnB
dβA is opposite to the sign of dτ
dβA.¥
A.2 Dynamics
Proof of Proposition 6 (stability of equilibrium).
The dynamic system is given by
nA,t+1 =( 1− λ)nAt + λmAΛ([VA (wA − τ (nAt,n Bt)) + lA − RA]/βA)

















































































The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (13) are µ1 =1− λ and µ2 =1− λ −




∂ni/βi,f o ri = A,B. The associated eigenvectors






























B) is locally stable (unstable) for λ ∈ (0,λ
f)(λ>λ
f). A
period doubling bifurcation occurs at λ = λ
f. If λ
f ≥ 1 then the equilibrium (n∗
A,n ∗
B)
is locally stable for all λ ∈ (0,1) (for the theory on period doubling bifurcations see
e.g. Kuznetsov 1995).¥
Proof of Proposition 7 (stability of equilibrium in the symmetric speciﬁed
model).
We use the above proof for the symmetric speciﬁed model with wA = wB = w,
mA = mB =1 ,β A = βB = β and lA = lB = l. For this case, the eigenvalues are




and µ2 =1 −λ−λγ (L1 − L2)








(> 0).A p e r i o d




1+2 l(L1 − L2)Λ0V 02/(βV
00)
.
55F o ro u re x a m p l ew eh a v eV (y)= 1
1−αy1−α , Λ(x)= 1
1+exp(πx/
√















where W =e x p
³³
w1−α







A.3 Replication of experimental data
Take V (x)=2 x1/2, Λ(x)=( 1+e x p ( ηx))
−1 and η = π
β
√
3.L e t (xA,0,x B,0) be the
initial participation rates from the experiment for one pair of groups. (This pair
of groups was selected from the subset of groups with enough ﬂuctuations in the
participation rates.) We run the theoretical model for all combinations (λ,η,R)
with λ ∈ {0,0.05,0.1,...,0.95,1},η∈ {0,0.05,0.1,...,0.95,1,1.5,2,2.5,3} and R ∈
{71,72,...,90} and generated two paths of participation rates for the selected pair
of groups. The calibrated parameters λ
c =0 .55,ηc =0 .75 and Rc =8 7are the
ones leading to the lowest root mean square error (rmse) between simulated and
experimental time series, for one of these two groups. Next, with the calibrated
values λ
c, ηc and Rc, we generated data for each of the other 13 groups, where we,
for each simulation, took the initial values equal to the ones from the corresponding
groups in the experiment. We then ran some nonparametric tests to test whether, for
each time period t ∈ {2,...,20}, the distribution of the experimental data is equal
to the distribution of the simulated data. The Man-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov
56and t-tests do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions at a 5%
signiﬁcance level in 95% (36 out of 38) of the cases. Only one group from each pair
of groups was used in order to have independent observations.
Then we constructed another set of simulated data in the following way. We took
the calibrated values λ
c, ηc and Rc from before and for each group, generated, for
diﬀerent initial values a time series. We then selected the initial values by looking at
the root mean squared error between simulated and experimental data again.
Subsequently, using the simulated and experimental data we estimated, for each
group, the following relation
xit = aiyit + bi,
where xit is the participation rate in group i in period t from the experiment, and yi,t
is the participation rate from the simulations, for the same group and time period. We
tested the null hypothesis H0 : a =1and b =0for each group. The null hypothesis
H0 is not rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level in 64% (9 out of 14 groups) of the cases.
Table (1) contains some other descriptive statistics for the distance between simulated
and experimental data, where the ﬁrst column corresponds to the simulated data
using the experimental participation rates for the initial values, whereas the second
column corresponds to the case where initial values are chosen from by means of the
root mean squared error criterion.






























is the Theil coeﬃcient. As to be expected, calibrating the initial values improves the
model performance. Note that the mean (standard deviation) of the Nash prediction




meanst.dev of (xit−yit) 0.048.25 0.006.195
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the performance of the simulated data.
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